



**STRATEGY
RESEARCH
PROJECT**

The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

**INTEGRATING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
AND THE ARMY RESERVE INTO THE WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION: CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ROLE**

BY

COLONEL GEORGE E. IRVIN, SR.
United States Army National Guard

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

SENIOR SERVICE COLLEGE FELLOW
AY01



U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050

20010713 081

USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

**INTEGRATING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND THE ARMY RESERVE INTO THE
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ROLE**

by

COL George E. Irvin, Sr.
Mississippi Army National Guard

Dr. Jerry Davis
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.

ABSTRACT

AUTHOR: George E. Irvin, Sr.

TITLE: Integrating The Army National Guard And The Army Reserve Into The Weapons of Mass Destruction: Consequence Management Role.

FORMAT: Strategy Research Project

DATE: 29 March 2001

PAGES: 76

CLASSIFICATION: Unclassified

The millennium began with the United States more concerned than ever about the threat of terrorism in "Hometown USA." The Reserve Component (RC) has played a major role in the defense of this nation for more than a quarter of a century and will have an extensive role in defending against the terrorist threat. This report will examine how the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the Army Reserve (USAR) have stepped forward to assume their roles in national defense. The ARNG and the USAR were once referred to as weekend warriors with little credibility with the Active Component (AC). They were seen as untrained and unfit for modern warfare. However, over the past twenty-five years, the myth has faded. The RC has proven time and time again, deployment after deployment, that it can hold its own with the AC.

The history of the ARNG and the USAR is briefly discussed in order to give a clearer understanding and appreciation of their contributions to national defense. A brief review of how the missions have evolved since the seventeenth century, and prior to the second amendment to the constitution that allowed states to establish the National Guard, will also be discussed. Evolution of the ARNG and the USAR, and their missions over the last decade has fully integrated the Army into one Army. The chief of staff of the Army said, "We are The Army - totally integrated into oneness of purpose - no longer the Total Army, no longer The One Army, The Army, One Army."¹ This paper will detail the ARNG and the USAR roles in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consequence management of homeland defense, and will briefly examine the training, equipment, and the ARNG response role of chemical and biological threats. It will also show how the ARNG and the USAR will partner with the AC and other

Federal agencies, such as Federal Emergency Management Agency, to carry out this mission. This paper will explain how state and local communities will be integrated into the WMD defense preparedness process. The final section of the paper will explain how the ARNG and the USAR, the AC, and other governmental entities will integrate and work together to deter this new national concern. Without minimizing the credibility of the AC, it will show how "The Army" can and will work together to accomplish the mission.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT.....	111
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS.....	VI1
INTEGRATING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND THE ARMY RESERVE INTO THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ROLE.....	1
INTRODUCTION.....	1
THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD.....	3
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND.....	3
MISSION.....	8
ORGANIZATION.....	8
PERSONNEL AND FORCE STRUCTURE.....	10
THE ARMY RESERVE.....	12
MISSION.....	12
TOTAL FORCE INTEGRATION.....	13
GUIDELINES/BACKGROUND.....	13
THE TOTAL FORCE.....	16
TOTAL FORCE AND THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY.....	17
INTEGRATION SUCCESS STORIES.....	19
BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION.....	20
WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION.....	22
BACKGROUND.....	23
POLICY AND LEGISLATION.....	27
WMD INTEGRATION.....	30
THE NATIONAL GUARD RESPONSE.....	32
CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ROLE.....	32

TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT.....	36
ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE FOR WMD HOMELAND DEFENSE.....	45
CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RAPID RESPONSE.....	49
BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION.....	49
COMMAND AND CONTROL.....	51
FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL INTEGRATION.....	52
CONCLUSIONS.....	55
ENDNOTES.....	61
BIBLIOGRAPHY.....	67

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1. NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU ORGANIZATION.....	10
FIGURE 2. ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE COMPOSITION FY00	12

INTEGRATING THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD AND THE ARMY RESERVE INTO THE WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION: CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ROLE

INTRODUCTION

Upon entering the new millennium, the United States is more concerned with the threat of terrorism, and the use of weapons of mass destruction on its soil than ever before. The threat of global war remains distant, and the nation's core values of representative democracy and market economics are embraced in many parts of the world creating new opportunities to promote peace, prosperity, and enhanced cooperation among nations.² The U.S. economy continues to thrive. Relationships with allies, such as NATO partners, Japan, The Republic of Korea, and others continue to adapt successfully to meet today's challenges.³ Despite these positive developments in the international environment, the world remains a complex, dynamic, and dangerous place.⁴ The United States has been immune to the threat of terrorism because of its status in international communities. The new forces of terror and instability are threatening to erode the peace that our allies and the U.S. so carefully crafted and maintained.⁵

As evidence that we are currently facing a new set of threats, we need only to examine recent events. The terrorists' bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania; the growing proliferation of low-cost cruise missiles; the atrocities in Kosovo; and sophisticated cyber events all reflect the nature of the changing and growing threats.⁶ The development and proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies with military and terrorist uses, including NBC weapons and their means of delivery, will continue despite the best efforts of the international community. The proliferation of these weapons and technologies could directly threaten the U.S., destabilize other regions of critical importance, and increase the number of potential adversaries with significant military capabilities, including smaller states and parties hostile to the United States.⁷

The Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 mandates the enhancement of domestic preparedness and response capability for terrorist attacks involving

nuclear, radiological, biological, and chemical weapons. The legislation provided funding to improve the capability of the federal, state, and local emergency response agencies to prevent and, if necessary, respond to domestic terrorist incidents involving weapons of mass destruction.⁸

In addition to the congressional mandate, several reviews of RC integration have been made by the Defense Board and, as a result, the Deputy Secretary of Defense asked it to provide an assessment for integrating the National Guard and Reserves into ongoing weapons of mass destruction preparedness roles.

After the final review of the assessment, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to develop a plan to integrate the RC into the DoD response to attacks using WMD, thus paving the way for the ARNG, and the USAR to become full partners in this process.

The integration of the AC and RC is one of the most important reshaping issues confronting the Army today. The RC of the U.S. Army consists of the USAR and the ARNG.⁹ The army must successfully integrate the resources and capabilities of the USAR and ARNG into "The Army," in order to meet future requirements.¹⁰

In "The Next Hundred Years," General Eric K. Shinseki, The Army Chief of Staff, listed one of his objectives for successfully achieving his goal of completing the full integration of the Active Army and Reserve Components.¹¹

General Shinseki captured the desired end-state of future changes within the Army when he said, "We are the Army – totally integrated into oneness of purpose – no longer the Total Army, no longer The One Army. We are The Army, and we will march into the 21st Century as the Army. We acknowledge the Components and their varying organizational strengths. We will work to structure The Army accordingly."¹²

The National Guard in its effort of further integration has adapted the slogan, "One Team –

One Fight -One Future,” which translates to “The Army.” More than just a slogan, these words reflect three ideas at the core of the efforts to create a single, seamless 21st Century force capable of supporting America’s national military strategy. The Army components must be supported, resourced, and modernized as a single and completely integrated team. This team must function and fight together as “The Army,” with each component of the team sharing in the duties and responsibilities of the nation’s defense.¹³

This report will address and focus on the integration of the ARNG and the USAR in the WMD Consequence Management Role. It will present a brief history, background, mission and organization of the ARNG and USAR. This report will also examine how the ARNG and the USAR will be utilized in response to chemical and biological threat. It will briefly discuss Total Force Integration, and the relationship to Weapons of WMD preparedness. I will also review the Total Force and National Military Strategy. The background, and legislation of WMD will also be reviewed, along with an examination of how the AC, RC, and other federal, state, and local government will integrate and work together.

THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

HISTORY AND BACKGROUND

The Army National Guard predates the founding of the nation and a standing military by almost a century and a half – and is, therefore, the oldest component of the United States armed forces. In 1636, the Massachusetts Bay Colony organized America’s first and oldest permanent militia regiments. The National Guard has since participated in every U.S. conflict from the Pequot War of 1637 to current deployments.¹⁴

The National Guard is a direct descendent of the militias of the thirteen original English colonies. The first colonists in Virginia and Massachusetts knew that they had to rely on themselves for their own defense. Although the colonists feared the traditional enemies of

England, the Spanish and Dutch, their main threats were the native Americans. The relations with the native Americans were relatively peacefully initially; however, as the colonists took more and more of the Indian's lands, war became more and more apparent. In 1622, nearly one quarter of the English settlers in Virginia were massacred. In 1637, English settlers in New England went to war against the Pequot Indians of Connecticut. These first Indian wars began a pattern that was to continue on the American frontier for the next 250 years.¹⁵

Barely ten years after the end of the French and Indian War, the colonists were at war with the British and the militia was to play a crucial role in the revolution. As the war progressed, American commanders learned how to make use of the citizen-soldiers to help defeat the British Army.¹⁶

When the fighting moved to the southern states in 1780, the generals learned to call out the local militia for specific battles in order to augment their full-time continental troops at the same time they were in a civil war. American people recognized the value and importance of the militia role in the winning the Revolutionary War. So when the founding fathers debated what form of government the new nation would take, great attention was paid to the militia.

The framers of the Constitution reached a compromise between the opposing point of view of the Federalist's and Anti-Federalists. The Federalists believed in a strong central government and wanted a large standing Army with a militia firmly under control of the federal government. The Anti-Federalists believed in the power of the states and a small or non-existent regular army with state controlled militias. The founding fathers were concerned about too much power being in the hands of one person, so they divided it between the President and the Congress. The Commander-in-Chief honor was given to the President to control all military forces, but Congress was provided the sole power to raise the taxes to pay the bills for the military and the right to declare war. In the militia, power was divided between the individual states and the federal government.¹⁷

In 1792, Congress passed a law that remained in effect for 111 years. With a few exceptions, the 1792 law required all males between the ages of 18 to 45 to enroll in the militia. The law did not require inspections by the federal government or penalties for non-compliance. As a result, the enrolled militia in many states went into a long decline. Once-a-year musters were often poorly organized and ineffective. Nevertheless, during the War of 1812, the militia provided the infant republic's main defense against the British invaders.¹⁸ As increasing numbers of immigrants began to arrive in the 1840's and 1850's, ethnic units such as the Irish Jasper Greens and the German Steuben Guards began to spring up.¹⁹

Militia units made up 70% of the U.S. Army that fought in the Mexican War in 1846 and 1847. Regulars were upset when militia officers outranked them and at times complained that the volunteer troops were sloppy and poorly disciplined. But complaints about the militia's fighting abilities declined as they helped win critical battles. The Mexican War set a military pattern that the nation would follow for the next 100 years; the regular officers provided military know-how and leadership while citizen-soldiers provided the bulk of the fighting troops.²⁰

When the civil war began in April, 1861, both Northern and Southern militia units rushed to join the Army. Both sides thought the war would be short. In the North the first volunteers were only enlisted for 90 days. After the war's first battle, it became obvious that the war would be a long one. President Lincoln called for 400,000 volunteers to serve for three years. Many militia regiments returned home, recruited and reorganized, and returned as three-year volunteer regiments.²¹

After the end of the Civil War, the south was under military occupation. States' right; to organize militias were suspended under reconstruction, and were returned only when a state had an acceptable republican government. Many African-Americans joined the militia units formed by these governments. This brought the militia back under white control, but black militia units survived in Alabama, North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and five Northern states.²²

In the late 1800s, there was unrest all over the country, from labor unrest in the industrializing Northeast and Midwest to many other growth areas. This caused states to examine their need for military force. After this reexamination, most states renamed the militia, "National Guard." The national guard units distinguished themselves during this period, with the most famous unit of the war being the cavalry unit recruited from Texas, New Mexico and Arizona National Guardsmen,

In 1903, a piece of landmark legislation the National Defense Act of 1903, opened the way for increased modernization and federal control over the National Guard. The law provided increased federal funding but, in order to obtain it, National Guard units had to reach minimum strengths and be inspected by regular Army officers. In 1916, another act was passed guaranteeing the state militia's status as the Army's primary reserve force, and requiring that all states rename their militia, "National Guard." The National Defense Act of 1916 prescribed qualifications for National Guard officers and allowed them to attend U.S. Army schools; required that each National Guard unit would be inspected and recognized by the War Department; and ordered that National Guard units would be organized like regular army units. The act also specified that guardsmen would be paid not just for annual training, but also for their drills.²³

After the Nation Defense Act was passed, the entire National Guard was called to active duty. Mexican bandits and revolutionaries were raiding border towns, so 158,000 guardsmen were placed along the Mexican borders by President Woodrow Wilson. They saw no action but, in 1917, the U.S. declared war on Germany and the National Guardsmen had a chance to put their training structure to good use.

The National Guard played a major role in World War I. Its units were organized into divisions by state, and those divisions made up 40% of the combat strength of the American Expeditionary Force. Three of the first five U.S. Army divisions to enter combat in World War I were from the National Guard. Further, the highest number of World War I Medals of Honor

recipients were from the 30th Division, made up of National Guardsmen from the Carolinas and Tennessee.²⁴

By 1930, the National Guard had 19 observation squadrons. By the summer of 1940, World War II was raging and much of Europe was in the hands of Nazi Germany. In the fall of 1940, the nation's first peacetime draft was enacted and the National Guard was called to active duty. All 18 National Guard divisions saw combat in World War II, and were split between the Pacific and European theatres. National guardsmen fought from the beginning. Three National Guard units participated in the heroic defense of Bataan in the Philippines before finally surrendering to the Japanese in the spring of 1942. When the U.S. Marines needed reinforcements on Guadalcanal in 1942, North Dakota's 164th Infantry became the first large body of U.S. Army troops to fight offensively in World War II. In the European theater, one National Guard division, the 34th from Minnesota, Iowa, and South Dakota, was the first to arrive overseas and participate in combat in North Africa. The 34th went on to spend the rest of the war fighting in Italy, and claimed more actual combat days than any other World War II division.²⁵

African Americans have always played a role in defense of this nation dating back beyond the Civil War. In 1947, New Jersey, a northern state, began to racially integrate their National Guard. The landmark Civil Rights Act of 1965 forced Southern states to follow New Jersey. More than a quarter century after the Civil Rights Act, African Americans made up 25% of the National Guard.

African American men had a history of militia service stretching back to colonial days; women, regardless of race, did not. Because the Militia Act of 1792 and the National Defense Act of 1916 had referred specifically to "males", it took special legislation to allow women to join. For years the only women in the National Guard were nurses but, in the 1970s, all the armed services began expanding opportunities for women. Following Army and Air Force policies, the National Guard saw its number of women recruits begin a steady rise that continues today.²⁶

By the end of the 1980s, ARNG units were supplied with the latest weaponry and equipment. In response to Iraq's invasion of oil-rich Kuwait in August 1990, Operation Desert Storm brought the largest mobilization of the National Guard since the Korean War. More than 60,000 ARNG personnel were called to active duty for the Gulf War. Today, the Guard is active both at home and abroad.²⁷

MISSION

The Army National Guard is the corner stone of nearly every community through out this nation. The dedication and devotion to duty has never been mere apparent than that of the present Guardsmen serving today. Members of the National Guard recognize, and understand, their mission.

The National Guard has a dual mission that is both a federal and state role. Although the Guard's primary mission is to serve as a federal reserve force, the National Guard has an equally important role in support of the states.²⁸ The ARNG is under the command of each States Governor who serves as Commander-in-Chief during peacetime. It is during this time that the required training is completed and emergency state duty is performed. However, when they are mobilized in support of federal mission, they are no longer under state control.


During the past ten years, there have been an increased number and scope of missions across America, with the Guard playing an expanding role in domestic response. As the nation prepares to meet the challenges of responding to threats of WMD, the Guard is assuming a key role that is a natural extension of years of domestic support and service.²⁹

ORGANIZATION

The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is located in Washington, DC, and is headed by a three-star General appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau (CNGB) oversees both the Army and Air Guards in all 50 states and 4

territories. Additionally, the CNGB serves as the National Guard representative to the four-star level Commander's Conference. Reporting to the CNGB are the Directors of the Army and Air National Guards. The Director of the Army National Guard (DARNG) leads the ARNG Directorate and oversees the administration of the budget resources among all of the ARNG structure. However, the DARNG does not exercise command and control over the military departments and units within the states and territories. Upon federalization of the National Guard, the President of the United States becomes the Commander-in-Chief. In each of the states, territories, and the District of Columbia, National Guard units fall under the command and control of The Adjutant General (TAG). The Governor or Senior Executive of the state or territory appoints The Adjutant General. The TAG is the head of the National Guard State Area Command (STARC). The primary mission of the STARC is to provide trained and ready units capable of performing their federal and state military missions.³⁰ The National Guard Bureau Organization is reflected in Figure 1.

National Guard Bureau Organization



Graphic by COL Daniel J. Dire, 2001

FIGURE 1. NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU ORGANIZATION.³¹

PERSONNEL AND FORCE STRUCTURE

The Army National Guard has approximately 367,000 soldiers in service across the 54 states and territories. Full-time soldiers serve the States and the Federal Government under Titles 10 and 32 under the US Code.³² Full -Time Support (FTS) ARNG personnel represent a cadre of Active Guard and Reserve (AGR) and military technicians who accomplish the day-to-day administration, recruitment, training, and maintenance for ARNG units. At the state level, AGR soldiers serve in the individual military departments of each state and territory under Title 32, United States Code. Title 32 AGR soldiers serve within each state or territory at the convenience of TAG. Under the provisions of Title 10, United States Code, AGR soldiers serve

in federal positions at the National Guard headquarters and other active army major commands.³³

Many soldiers serve part time, and have skills that they use in both their civilian and military careers, such as in medical, aviation, military police and technological fields. Still other soldiers have specialties that differ widely from their civilian jobs and offer them leadership opportunities and challenging training such as in the combat arms fields of infantry, armor, and field artillery. These soldiers are known as traditional guardsmen and are comprised of approximately 87 percent of the ARNG end-strength.³⁴

State employees also fill critical positions in the State Military Department. State employees, working in the State Military Department, are funded by the state in which they work and do not have any military or federal service affiliation. In the purest sense, these are state government employees hired to augment the military workforce of the state's Military Department.³⁵

The Guard is comprised of a balanced force structure of Combat, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support units. Several initiatives are contributing to important changes in the Guard force structure. An example is the Division Redesign process which transitions two combat divisions to combat support and combat service support roles. Other important initiatives are the implementation of Guard/Active component division headquarters within three Army Guard Brigades. Currently, of the Army's total force, the ARNG composes 55 percent of combat forces, 36 percent of CS forces and 33 percent of CSS forces, as indicated in Figure 2.




FIGURE 2. ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE COMPOSITION FY00³⁶

THE U.S. ARMY RESERVE

MISSION

The U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC), a major subordinate command of U.S. Army Forces Command, commands, controls, and supports all USAR troop units in the continental United States with the exception of Psychological Operations and Civil Affairs units. The USARC also ensures the readiness of its forces and prepares the nearly 1,700 units under its command to mobilize and deploy to a wartime theater of operation.

USARC command and control structure is designed to focus on training; readiness; supporting mobilization; and providing military support to other federal agencies. Eleven Regional Support Commands (RSCs) located throughout the United States provide resource, logistics and personnel management service to all Army Reserve units within their region. Three Regional Support Groups (RSGs) assist the RSC in providing administrative, logistics and general support services.

USARC manages 500 USAR units, which are part of the Army's Force Support Package (FSP). In case of a mobilization, units in the Army Reserve's FSP would be activated immediately to provide combat support and combat service support capabilities. The Tiered

Resource Program, implemented and managed by the USARC, is designed to improve unit readiness and also ensure units in the Army Reserve FSP receive the highest priority for all resources.

The USARC also manages the overseas deployment for training (ODT) program, allowing USAR units to perform mission-related training while providing mission-essential medical, transportation, maintenance and engineering capabilities to America's Army. USAR soldiers and units have deployed to Southwest Asia and Central America to provide support to active Army missions in Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Jordan, Honduras, Guatemala and Haiti.

On the home-front, the USARC is involving UASR soldiers in the Civil-Military Cooperation Program (CMCP). The program uses the Army Reserve's expertise to provide communities around America with mission-related support and allows for disaster response planning and preparations.

TOTAL FORCE INTEGRATION

GUIDELINES/BACKGROUND

Today, from Africa to Asia, from Europe to the Middle East, Americans in uniform are standing tall on the front lines of freedom, defending our values and interest in an uncertain world. Wherever U.S. military forces are deployed, men and women from the RC can be found serving side by side with their AC counterparts. The role of the RC has changed in the past decade, and the Department of Defense (DoD) is working to better integrate reservists into a seamless Total Force.

As the Cold War moderated and eventually wound down in a rapid and stunningly successful fashion, the nation restructured its military forces and embraced a new national military strategy. Today this strategy is three-fold: it calls on the military to shape the international environment, prepare the forces for the future, and respond to crises when and where its interests are required. As the U.S. embraces this new strategy for a new century, its

Guard and Reserve are moving to the forefront of efforts to secure peace, ensure democracy, and nurture market economies on a global scale.³⁷

When Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen became the 20th Secretary of Defense, he arrived at the Pentagon with a lifetime of service to the nation and a keen understanding of the nature and purpose of America's reserve forces. The Secretary had been watching the evolution of those forces for over twenty years, first from his vantage-point in the House of Representatives and then in the Senate. He recognized and appreciated the fact that, as the nation was beginning to change its military strategy to meet the changing requirements of a new, post-Cold War era, it would also have to change the way it viewed and used reservists. Towards that end, in September 1997, Secretary Cohen promulgated his Total Force Memorandum, which called on the Services' Secretaries, the Service Chiefs, and the Global Commanders in Chief (CINCs) to identify and remove all remaining barriers, both structural and culturally, to bring about the seamless integration of the Total Force. In his memorandum, the Secretary defines integration as, "The conditions of readiness and trust needed for the leadership at all levels to have well-justified confidence that the reserve components are trained and equipped to serve as an effective part of the joint and combined force within whatever timelines are set for the unit in peace and war." Secretary Cohen also cast integration as the elimination of the barriers that historically existed in an operational, institutional and cultural sense between the AC and RC. But as a close reading of the recent rhetoric and actions of our senior defense leaders clearly illustrates, integration requires more than the removal of barriers. Integration means changing the way we think about the nature and purpose of our reserve forces. Moreover, it means changing the way we think and act, so that individuals who serve in the Guard and Reserve are not treated as second class citizens, so that they have access to benefit parity, though not straight equality, and serve in an environment in which benefits are appropriate to the level of participation. Integration also implies a way of conducting military operations, whether they be peacekeeping, small-scale contingencies or major theater wars,

that fully utilize the unique capabilities resident in all components and all services, so that when U.S. military forces take to the field, they do not suffer deficiencies as a result of the blending of active and reserve units.³⁸

In May 1998, an ad hoc committee consisting of reserve, active duty, and civilian board members recommended, with the approval of the full board, a set of guidelines to assist each of the services as they devised their Total Force implementation plan in accordance with the Secretary of Defense's goal of seamless integration. The following guidelines were disseminated with the Deputy Secretary of Defense concurrence.

- Services should have a methodology to continually identify cultural and structural barriers and implement strategies to reduce or eliminate them.
- Services should identify short-term goals to enhance Total Force confidence and trust while simultaneously developing long-term strategies to institutionalize a strong working relationship between all components.
- Services should take appropriate action to reinforce that the Service Chief of Staff/Chief of Naval Operations/Commandant of the Marine Corps, with the full cooperation of senior Guard and Reserve leadership, is accountable for all Service components.
- Consistent with the Defense Planning Guidance, all components should have well-defined missions which delineate pre- and post-mobilization requirements to execute their missions.
- Consider developing a resource policy and budget process for the peacetime use of Guard and Reserves.
- Should develop a process to set common standards (both pre- and post-mobilization) within all components. Give required support to allow the Guard and Reserve to train

to those standards. Develop a cooperative Total Force approach to assess whether the units are in fact meeting required standards.³⁹

The Board's theme for 1998 was "The Year of Total Force Integration," a theme that ended up being synonymous with some of the events that happened that year. In a symbolic gesture toward achieving full integration of the AC and RC, Secretary of Defense Cohen implemented the Total Force Identification (ID) card initiative in June 1998. This initiative directed that ID cards be the same color (green) for all active and reserve component military personnel. This change responds to a pledge made by Secretary Cohen in a policy memorandum calling on DoD's civilian and military leadership to eliminate "all residual barriers-structural and cultural-to effective integration of the RC and AC into a seamless Total Force."⁴⁰

As you can see, Secretary of Defense Cohen has set the stage for completion of Total Force integration. His effort has been more aggressive than any other Secretary of Defense. Through his leadership, this initiative has been moved to the forefront by Army senior leadership.

THE TOTAL FORCE

Achieving a seamless Total Force requires command emphasis on supporting the principles of Total Force integration. Progress toward improved integration of reserve and active components depends on the ability of key military and civilian leaders to create an environment that eliminates all biases of effective integration. To achieve effective integration, the following basic principles must be applied consistently:

- Clearly understand responsibility for and ownership of the Total Force by senior leaders.
- Clear and mutual understanding of the mission for each unit-active, Guard, and Reserve-in Service and joint/combined operations, during peace and war.
- Commitment to provide the resources needed to accomplish assigned missions.

- Leadership by senior commanders-Active, Guard, and Reserve-to ensure the readiness of the Total Force.

There are five armed forces in the United States defense structure: the Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard. Within each armed force, there is an AC and at least one RC. The Army and Air Force each have two reserve components. The AC comprises those men and women assigned to units or special accounts in the active military force structure. There are seven reserve components: the Army National Guard, Army Reserve, Naval Reserve, Marine Corps Reserve, Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve, and Coast Reserve. The reserve components provide trained units and qualified men and women for active duty in time of war or national emergency and at other times in support of the National Military Strategy.

Within the reserve components, personnel service in one of three manpower management categories: the Ready Reserve, the Standby Reserve, and the Retired Reserve. The Ready Reserve is made up of three subgroups: the Selected Reserve, the Individual Ready Reserve, and the Inactive National Guard. There is no Standby Reserve in the Army National Guard or Air National Guard.⁴¹

TOTAL FORCE AND THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY

Since the Cold War, the National Guard and Reserve have become a larger percentage of the Total Force and are essential partners in a wide range of military operations, from smaller-scale contingencies to major theater war. Guard and Reserve forces provide trained units and individuals to fight in wartime and support the wide range of DoD operations in peacetime. Today, reserve forces are included in all war plans, and no major military operation can be successful without them. Reserve components are being called upon more frequently and for longer periods in peacetime than ever before because of high operating and personnel tempo demands on the active component. Because this trend is expected to continue, the Department

is making major changes to doctrine, training, education, and materiel to ensure reserve components can rapidly deploy when needed.⁴²

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) concluded that national leaders must have a range of viable options for promoting and protecting U.S. interests in peacetime, during crises, and in war. The demonstrated potential of the reserve components to provide increased military capability at a lower overall cost is influencing changes in the mix of active, reserve, and civilian forces. The Total Force will increasingly depend on the reserve components to serve in their traditional role as a hedge against uncertainty and also to provide a more robust and blended deployable force to ease operating and personnel tempo.⁴³

Reserve components are essential to operations in and supporting the Bosnia peacekeeping force. As of December 1999, 19,451 guardsmen and reservists have served in this effort and returned to civilian life, while another 1000 are on active duty. RC forces have been and continue to be deployed to provide vital augmentation in civil affairs, psychological operations, aviation, air traffic control, military police, public affairs and military history, medical, supply, and transportation. In addition, over 500 RC volunteers may be found supporting operations in Bosnia on a daily basis.

A smaller number of guardsmen and reservists are supporting recent United States Central Command operations in Kuwait and the Persian Gulf. The USAR provides needed capabilities in biological/chemical warfare detection. Over 399 guardsmen and reservists have supported operations, or are now on active duty. Over 10,000 Reservists, both Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve, have voluntarily supported air superiority operations over the north and south of Iraq in Operations Northern and Southern Watch.

Over the past two years, the RC's have provided support to Total Force missions across the entire spectrum of military operations. Support provided has equated to approximately 13 million man-days (or the equivalent of about 35,000 full time personnel) in both FY 1996 and 1997. This equates to about one-third of the level of support provided during the peak of the

Gulf War, when more than 250,000 reservists served on active duty for an average of six months.⁴⁴

INTEGRATION SUCCESS STORIES

The Army has faced perhaps the greatest integration challenges and, some would say, made the greatest progress. General Eric Shinseki, Army Chief of Staff, has shown outstanding leadership in calling for a change in terminology, which can be seen as a harbinger of greater changes to come. When he took office in June 1999, he said, "Today, I declare that we are The Army, totally integrated with a unity of purpose, no longer the Total Army, no longer One Army. We are The Army, and we will march into the 21st century as The Army." With this utterance, General Shinseki displayed his seriousness about integration and further eroded the distinction between full and part-time soldiers.⁴⁵

Within the Army, the selected reserve elements of the ARNG and USAR comprise 54 percent of the force. The ARNG and USAR units provide essential combat, combat support and combat service support to the Army. Their contributions are particularly important in high-demand, low-density units. For example, by percentage of the Army, RC provide the following capabilities: public affairs (82%), civil affairs (97%), medical brigades (85%), psychological operations units (81%), engineering battalions (70%), and military police battalions (66%). But the Army is doing more than taking advantage of the unique capabilities inherent in its Guard and Reserve components. It is also assigning wholesale missions to them, including the unprecedented act of tasking the 49th Division of the Texas Army National Guard to assume command of the American sector in Bosnia, in March 2000. In addition, eight ARNG enhanced separate brigades have sent, or will send, companies to form battalion-level task forces for future rotations of SFOR, and units from North Carolina, Oklahoma, Mississippi, and Georgia, will also play a central role. These planned deployments send a clear signal about the Army's increased reliance on, and trust in its reserve forces.

The Navy is also making significant progress in building a seamless force. Naval Reserve units are an integral part of many mission areas of the Navy, including fleet logistics, maritime patrol, carrier and helicopter wings, mobile construction forces, intelligence units, surface combatants, explosive ordnance disposal, undersea warfare units, operational and administrative staffs, special warfare, and medical support units. For example, by percentage of the total Navy, Naval Reserve contributions include mobile inshore undersea warfare units (100%), logistics support squadrons (100%), cargo handling battalions (93%), mobile construction battalions (60%), and fleet hospitals (40%), Naval Reservists make up about 50% of the Navy mine countermeasure forces, with 13 mine ships, including the Navy's only Mine Control Ship, USS Inchon. The Selected Reserve part of the Naval Reserve comprises 20 percent of the Navy.

The Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve perform a broad range of combat and combat support missions, including counter air interdiction, close air support strategic and tactical airlift, aerial refueling, space operations, force protection, aeromedical evacuation, aerospace rescue and recovery and special operations, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve contributions, by percentage of the total Air Force, include strategic interceptor force (100%), tactical airlift (64%), aerial refueling and strategic tankers (55%), tactical air support (38%), strategic airlift (27%) and special operations (17%). The Selected Reserve elements of the Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve comprise 33 percent of the Air Force.⁴⁶

BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION

In July 1998, the Reserve Forces Policy Board sponsored a symposium at the National Defense University to work the provisions of Secretary Cohen's issues on Integration of the RC and AC. One of the Secretary's major concerns was his desire to create an environment that eliminates all barriers for Total Force integration. The purpose of the symposium was to identify and examine the cultural and structural barriers that exist between the active, Guard and

Reserve components and focus on their cause and impact upon the integration of the total force.

During the symposium, various speakers and participants identified and examined the cultural and structural barriers affecting integration. Reservists discussed the cultural barriers they felt existed when they transitioned from AC to a RC. The two primary cultural barriers they all agreed upon were that the active component did not train and educate its members on the roles and capabilities of the reserve components, and the feeling by National Guard and Reserve personnel that they were perceived as second-class citizens. The symposium identified the causes of cultural and structural barriers, the impact on Total Force integration, a possible solution to the barrier and what that solution will accomplish, and a process to make the solution a reality. Many barriers were discussed; however, they were refined into five main cultural, and six main structural barriers.

The cultural barriers identified between the Active, Guard, and Reserve were grouped under these five main categories:

- Lack of trust (both sides)/lack of confidence in reserve component capability by active duty.
- Failure of the Services to adequately manage all their components as a seamless organization.
- Second-class citizen syndrome.
- Inadequate/ineffective coordination and communication between active and reserve components.
- Roles of each component not clearly identified for an effectively integrated 21st century military force.

The structural barriers identified between the Active, Guard, and Reserve were grouped under these six main categories:

- Lack of a coordinated total force approach to the services' budgeting process.
- Incompatible pay and personnel systems.
- Incompatible equipment and weapon systems.
- Inadequate representation of the Guard and Reserve senior leadership, at the appropriate grade level, on active duty staffs.
- Lack of a coordinated total force approach in developing and implementing training and military education requirements and programs.
- Inappropriate disparities in benefits, in today's military environment, between Active, Guard, and Reserve forces.⁴⁷

An integrated Total Force is the key to achieving the goals of shaping, responding, and preparing for challenges and opportunities confronting the nation today and tomorrow. Only a well-balanced, seamlessly integrated military force is capable of dominating opponents across the full range of military operations. Using the concepts and principles of the National Military Strategy, the Concept for Future Joint Operations, and the Total Force Policy, the Department of Defense will continue managing change and responding to the challenges of restructuring, streamlining and modernizing its Total Force to ensure efficient and effective joint operations.⁴⁸

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

I believe the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction presents the greatest threat that the world has ever known. We are finding more and more countries who are acquiring technology – not only missile technology – and are developing chemical weapons and biological weapons capabilities to be used in theater and also on a long range basis. So I think that is perhaps the greatest threat that any of us will face in the coming years.

SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WILLIAM COHEN

January 1997

BACKGROUND

The United States has been a target of extremist elements threatening to use a WMD device since 1970. The first threatened use of a nuclear/radiological device occurred in 1970. Over 100 such cases involving threatened use of a nuclear/radiological device have occurred, but the only known incident in which the individual actually possessed a device occurred in 1979. A distressed, former employee of a nuclear fuel plant threatened to distribute uranium throughout the downtown area of a city. Fortunately, the individual was apprehended before executing his plan.

The enemies are faceless individuals (or groups) who have determined the only way the United States can understand their viewpoint, is through the calculated and indiscriminate use of violent acts. Unfortunately, these acts now include the potential to use chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. The enemy comprises a variety of non-aligned adversaries. These adversaries consist of transnational individuals and states, United States citizens and non-citizens living in the United States.

The use or threatened use of chemical/biological weapons has never been more prevalent. In 1984, members of the Rajneesh religious sect in Oregon produced and dispersed Salmonella in salad bars at restaurants. Seven hundred and fifteen people were injured without any fatalities. In March 1989, the most intensive food safety investigation in FDA history took place when a terrorist threatened to poison this nation's fresh fruit supply to focus attention on the living conditions of the lower classes in Chile. The terrorist made good on his phone call to the FDA, as two grapes were found laced with small amounts of cyanide. Fortunately no one was poisoned, but the incident cost millions of dollars to investigate in this country, and had a significant impact on Chile's national economy, where fruit and vegetable exports are second in importance only to copper. A biological toxin could have been used just as easily as cyanide in this instance.

The amounts of toxin needed to obtain the desired effect are exceedingly small. For example, about 30 grams of the toxin *ricin*, easily concealed in a pocket, would be sufficient to lethally poison one batch of 150 pounds of meat, enough to produce 1,500 hot dogs. In 1991, members of the Patriot's Council in Minnesota used castor beans to manufacture *ricin* and planned to use the biological agent against a Federal law enforcement officer. They made enough *ricin* to kill over 100 people. On February 26, 1993, a car bomb at the World Trade Center in New City exploded killing six and wounding over 1,000 people. Little mention was made concerning the presence of sodium cyanide residue found on debris at the scene. Fortunately, the terrorists placed the sodium cyanide too close to the explosive, thereby evaporating the agent before it could injure anyone. On March 20, 1995, the Japanese cult, Aum Shinrikyo, used the deadly gas, *sarin*, during rush hour traffic in a busy subway in Tokyo, Japan, killing 12 and injuring 5,500 people.⁴⁹

The defining domestic attack, which caused the United States to review its laws and policies concerning terrorism, occurred on April 19, 1995. A truck full of explosives was detonated in front of the Federal Building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, killing 168 and injuring over 500 people. Fortunately, there were no chemical or biological agents involved. The bombing in Atlanta, Georgia, on July 27, 1996, reinforced the government's necessity to enact legislation to reduce the United States' vulnerability against terrorist attacks. A bomb placed near a bleacher exploded in an Atlanta park during an Olympic Celebration, killing two and injuring 110 people.

Different people espousing varied ideologies carried out each attack. The Rajneesh religious sect used the salmonella attack to effect the outcome of a local election. An Islamic extremist group upset by our Mid-east policy was responsible for the attack in New York City. The Patriot's Council, a right wing extremist group, was anti-government and anti-taxes. The attack in Oklahoma City was in response to the Federal Government's attack on the Branch

Davidian's residence in Waco, Texas. The attack in Atlanta was suspected to be in response to someone's opposition to abortion and the Federal Government.⁵⁰

When domestic terrorism shook Oklahoma City six years ago, the local, state and federal governments came face to face with a nightmare: the startling realization that America was susceptible to massive attacks on the homeland. More and more officials are beginning to imagine what chaos such an attack would cause American citizens.⁵¹

As we approach the 21st century, our foes have extended the fields of battle – from physical space to cyber space; from the world's vast bodies of water to the complex workings of our own bodies. Rather than invading our beaches or launching bombers, these adversaries may attempt cyber-attacks against our critical military systems and our economic base. Or they may deploy compact and relatively cheap weapons of mass destruction – not just nuclear, but also chemical or biological, to use disease as a weapon of war.

President Clinton -- May 22, 1998

Terrorism is one of the greatest threats facing America. From homegrown terror in Oklahoma City to foreign terror in New York, terrorism is increasing. Terrorism's intensity is changing as well, while terrorist attacks using bombs or conventional explosive remain the most likely threat, the threat of an unconventional attack is also real and rising.

Unconventional attacks could employ chemical, biological or nuclear weapons, or any combination of them with conventional explosives. Aum Shinrikyo also experimented with anthrax and went to Africa to try to get Ebola to use as a biological weapon. Larry Harris, a white supremacist living in Ohio, ordered and received three vials of *Yersinia pestis* from a mail-order firm in Maryland. *Yersinia pestis* causes bubonic plague. Many nations--Iran, Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, Taiwan, Israel, Egypt, Vietnam, Laos, Cuba, Bulgaria, India, South Korea, South Africa, China and Russia; are suspected of vigorously developing biological capabilities. Freelance terrorists like Usama Bin Laden, as well as homegrown terrorists in the United States, have demonstrated an interest in acquiring chemical and biological weapons.

Terrorists attack or threaten attacks to make a statement. They seek to leverage their resources and sow fear and panic. Unconventional weapons suit their purposes well. While many experts feel that the threat of a terrorist attack using unconventional weapons, or weapons of mass destruction, has been sensationalized and exaggerated, most experts also agree that the threat is real and growing.⁵²

The Quadrennial Defense Review and National Defense Panel identified a host of threats to America: information warfare, terrorism, WMD, and international crime, including trafficking in arms, strategic materials and drugs.

Concerns for new non-traditional threats are wide spread and senior policy pronouncements recognize the importance of these threats to national security. Non-traditional threats are not strictly military in nature; to the extent they are not, they will confound traditional military approaches, and challenge tradition and culture regarding domestic use of the Armed Forces. Defense against these non-traditional threats is inherently complex, and requires the coordination of government agencies at all levels, consistent with appropriate authorities and capabilities. This new security environment suggests greater domestic use of the military.

Because the new threats to U.S. security are domestic, the National Military Strategy, Quadrennial Defense Review, National Defense Panel (NDP), and Defense Science Board identified homeland defense as a major mission area.⁵³

The United States is concerned about continuing weapon proliferation problems in the former Soviet Union. While Russia has new controls on missile technology exports, it hasn't followed through on enforcing them; they have been exporting technology to Iran.

As North Korea's economy deteriorates, the impetus increases for it to sell its know-how in WMD. CIA Director George Tenet said, "North Korea's sales of such products over the years have dramatically heightened the weapons of mass destruction threat in countries of key concern, such as Iran and Pakistan." The CIA director also said "Proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, including the means to launch them constitutes the greatest single threat to

vital U.S. national interests".⁵⁴ The North Koreans have been instrumental in helping Iran and Pakistan leapfrog technologies to develop their own missiles. Through North Korea's help, India, Iran and Pakistan have also become technology exporters. These examples demonstrate the difficulty law enforcement agencies face identifying potential domestic terrorists. Adding to law enforcement difficulties is the ease individuals have to obtain information on how to manufacture chemical or biological agents instability, economic hardships, and lax security measures in Russia and several former Soviet states have also increased the possibility for a nuclear terrorist incident. As a result of the threat of more terrorist acts, the Clinton administration and Congress wrote new policies and legislation to address our vulnerabilities.⁵⁵

POLICY AND LEGISLATION

The Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996 sponsored by Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici mandates the enhancement of domestic preparedness and response capability for terrorist attacks involving nuclear, radiological, and chemical weapons. The legislation provided funding to improve the capability of the federal, state and local emergency response agencies to prevent and, if necessary, respond to domestic terrorist incidents involving WMD.

The DoD was given the lead in the development of the Emergency Response Assistance Program as part of a federal interagency effort. The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) designated the Secretary of the Army (SECARMY) as the Executive Agent for DoD program Assistance implementation. The Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD(SO/LIC)) provides policy and funding oversight for the DoD Domestic Preparedness Program.⁵⁶

In 1996, the Defense against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act was signed into law. This "Nunn, Lugar, Dominici Act" authorized the National Guard and other Reserve components to assist the SECDEF in training civilian personnel of federal, state and local agencies regarding

WDM responses. Among the 26 findings identified in the Act were lack of adequate planning and countermeasures to address the threat of a nuclear, biological and chemical terrorism and state and local emergency response personnel were not adequately prepared or trained for such incidents.

Senator Lugar firmly believes such attack an is imminent. Whether or not Senator Lugar is correct, any WMD attack may exceed the nation's current ability to respond. Preparation for an effective response to a WMD attack requires a commitment of resources before an attack occurs. Although disaster response is essentially a civil responsibility involving many levels of government, only the DoD can practically field and maintain the capabilities required to mitigate the consequences of a WMD attack.

Although public policy fully recognizes the threat of WMD and the need to design an effective response, doing so will not be easy. The WMD threat is complex. Its magnitude requires a variety of governmental actions to prevent and limit the scope and consequences of any incident. Existing federal, state, civil and military agencies and organizations have capabilities relevant to meeting the threat, but the structure and authority of these organizations were established to meet other public service needs. Appropriate organization is necessary to bring to bear all the resources needed to effectively deal with WMD. Designing the DoD's role requires an assessment of organizations and capabilities, and that assessment must address institutional and operational obstacles to effective policy.⁵⁷

By policy and tradition, the National Guard is the cornerstone of military support to civil authorities. DoD Directive 3025.1 designates the National Guard as the primary DoD agency for disaster relief, and the 1993 Bottom Up Review characterizes the Guard as the first line of defense in domestic emergencies and threats to domestic tranquility.

At the federal level, responsibilities for terrorist attacks or activities are divided between crisis management and consequence management. The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)

has responsibility for crisis management and criminal investigation of terrorist threat involving a weapon of mass destruction.

The FBI, which is the lead agency in responding to a terrorist incident, was directed to reduce vulnerabilities by expanding the counter-terrorism program. The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), responsible for consequence management, was tasked to ensure the Federal Response Plan is adequate to respond to the consequences of terrorism.

Federal assistance requires presidential authorization, and the FEMA is responsible for coordinating the federal response, to include military support provided to civil authorities. Organized geographically in twenty-seven regions throughout the U.S., FEMA possesses no resources of its own. FEMA has published a federal response plan, and identified twelve emergency support functions essential to providing effective assistance. FEMA does provide the Emergency Support Functions (ESF) staff and the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO) during a federal relief operation. Further, FEMA plans, coordinates, and controls federal assets employed in support of state authorities. DoD possesses significant resources for providing such assistance and figures prominently in the twelve Emergency Support Functions (ESF) and Federal Response Plan (FRP).

When circumstances exceed resident National Guard capabilities, federal reserve and active forces can be brought to bear through presidential authorization. Under such action, federal military forces report to a designated Federal Coordinating Officer, not the governor or local officials. State National Guard forces may also be federalized through presidential authorization, thus becoming a federal, not a state, asset. Accordingly, state and territorial Governors lose their authority over the National Guard when federalized.

The Department of Defense was directed to develop and maintain at least one domestic rapid response team comprising both civilian and military personnel. The rapid response team would be responsible for aiding federal, state, and local officials in "detecting, neutralizing, containing, dismantling, and disposing of weapons of mass destruction or its materials."⁵⁸

WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION INTEGRATION

Integration of the RC is the most important aspect of the defense against WMD. The National Guard is in nearly every community in this nation, and already has a relationship with local authority.

On March 17, 1998, SECDEF William S. Cohen announced the establishment of a Consequence Management Program Integration Office to oversee the integration of the RC with domestic preparations to respond to terrorist or other incidents involving WMD. The SECARMY, as the executive agent for domestic preparedness, will supervise the office and its integration efforts.

Integrating the reserves into national plans to respond to domestic WMD incidents is another step in fulfilling Secretary Cohen's recent mandate to achieve full integration of the AC and RC. In his September 4, 1997, memo on the integration of the AC and RC, he called on the military services to provide the National Command Authorities with a total force that provides "the flexibility and interoperability necessary for the full range of military operations."

The new office's primary function will be to bring RC integration in synch with current interagency WMD preparedness programs, and to establish ten Rapid Assessment and Initial Detection (RAID) elements. The RAID elements will enhance DoD's immediate response capability. Everyone involved agreed that ten RAID teams were scattered, and could not be effective. As a result, RAID was reorganized to civil support (CS) teams and will be increased to 27.

Each civil support element, consisting of 22 highly-trained, full-time National Guard personnel, will have the mission of providing early assessment, initial detection, and technical advice to local incident commanders during an incident involving WMD, and then initiating requests for additional state or federal response assets. Their goal is to deploy rapidly and arrive quickly at the site of a domestic WMD incident. The teams will be supported by

reconnaissance and decontamination teams drawn from existing reserve components forces, and they also will facilitate the arrival of DoD or other federal agency assets.

The office will integrate overall WMD training and exercises, purchase equipment for the military response elements, and coordinate the necessary training for each. It will also work closely with the Departments of Health and Human Services, Veterans Affairs, the FEMA, and other federal agencies.⁵⁹

Integration takes place in several ways, accordingly to General Roger Schultz, Director, Army National Guard, "This is not simply about adding another responsibility to Guard and Reserve soldiers and building them into a unit...It's also about exercising with state and community 'first responders' and exercising with federal government partners around the nation. It's integrating the Guard and Reserve into the response community's capabilities in such a way we create a habitual relationship."⁶⁰

Another promising area of AC/RC integration is that of Information Operations (IO), which is well suited to integration of RC capability, especially information technology skills acquired by individual reserve members in their civilian professions. Whereas active duty personnel may struggle to keep pace with commercial advances in computer networks, reservists are often in step with these advances by the very nature of their civil sector employment and workplace training.

Deputy Secretary of Defense, John Hamre said that the DoD is also deeply engaged in an ongoing interagency process within the federal government to provide support to civil authorities in the event of an attack using WMD. This type of homeland defense mission will be one of the most critical of the coming century, in part because we, as a nation, are beginning to face the fact that the war against terrorism will not be waged only overseas, but also right here at home. We are making real progress in the homeland defense arena, and the Guard and Reserve are front and center in that effort. Dr. Hamre said, "the capability the Department needs to develop has to largely be grounded in the National Guard and our Reserve forces. Under our normal

way of doing business, active units are overseas on the front line. Our active duty forces are forward deployed and our Reserves go and reinforce. In homeland defense, it is exactly the other way around.”⁶¹

THE NATIONAL GUARD RESPONSE

CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT ROLE

“We no longer face a single, powerful enemy, as we did during the Cold War. We don’t live with a balance of terror. But we face terrorists, and We do face the terrorizing possibility some nation or group will try to use a deadly chemical or biological weapon against our forces or our homeland.”

Secretary of Defense William Cohen--October 1998

Consequence management (CQM) is much greater than the limited enhancements to disaster relief presently underway. CQM, by contrast, describes ways and means to alleviate the short and long-term physical socio-economic, and psychological effects of a chemical or biological attack. The term includes preparatory work in response to a WMD threat against the Super Bowl, for example--that would include site surveys; assessment of the ability of local hospitals to treat or decontaminate victims; and the size, condition, and locations of local stocks of various antidotes. Preparation could include determining the locations, size, and availability of other national antidote stocks, as well as international stocks available to support planning for surge capacity. Thereafter, should police agencies be unable to prevent the incident, consequence management would include treatment of victims within a contaminated zone, their decontamination and evacuation, and local cleanup. It would also involve psychological treatment and other efforts to restore confidence in the social and economic well being of the affected area and of the country itself.

The effectiveness of the CQM response depends on the chemical or biological sample that would be taken from the disseminating device itself or from contaminated material within

the hot zone. Most importantly, once correctly identified, the samples would determine what kind of health response was necessary. Samples would also begin to build the case against the perpetrators. Thus the potentially conflicting needs to prepare for mass casualties and to facilitate evidence collection are bound together in establishing a concept of CQM.

CQM is a political problem. True, it is a humanitarian problem and is a disaster of the technical type. People die every day from accidents and other causes, but people do not die regularly from WMD attacks initiated by terrorists within the United States. As unlikely as this threat may seem, its potential has resulted in sustained political attention. But will the short attention span of the political process produce, as it often does, a decision to "just do something". A good example is the, the CQM effort in Atlanta during the 1996 olympics which was extraordinary. To move in such a short time from time from *tabula rasa* to an operational concept that was ready to react in an emergency is perhaps unprecedented, especially given the technical issues involved with becoming operational. Yet despite these great strides, the CQM program remained a stepchild of the general security effort.

It appears that the establishment of the CBRRT and RAID elements, and specified WMD medical and NBC reconnaissance training for designated ARNG and USAR units, provide the WMD-related peculiarities of disaster relief.

Because of the magnitude of the consequences associated with WMD, preparing a proper homeland defense requires sound planning and the establishment of a viable organization to provide those capabilities. Consequence management (CQM) is skill and resource intensive, even outside of the "hot zone", and requires units possessing particular capabilities.

The ARNG, with its inherent qualities and characteristics, can easily establish an extensive and comprehensive WMD homeland defense throughout the nation. Homeland defense built on the ARNG can be fully integrated into all appropriate civil agencies, uniquely responsive to situational requirements, and meet the expectations of the public.

DoD directive 3025.1 designates the ARNG as the primary DoD agency for disaster relief, and the 1993 Bottom Up Review characterizes the Guard as the first line of defense in domestic emergencies and threats to domestic tranquillity. In those missions, the Guard is usually integrated into state emergency management plans. Not surprisingly, the National Defense Panel (NDP) report and the Defense Science Board (DSB) recommended assignment of CQM responsibilities to ARNG units.⁶²

The ARNG traditional structure has evolved into a community based, regionally organized posture throughout the nation. It is integrally linked to state and local civil authorities and emergency management systems, and has been a model of civil-military inter-agency cooperation and structure. The ARNG can provide comprehensive WMD homeland defense throughout the nation, but will require major structural adjustments to ensure it possesses the necessary organization, authorities, and capabilities.

Changes to ARNG structure that provide a comprehensive WMD homeland defense will have additional benefits to the Army at large. Since 1989, total Army structure has been reduced by 35%, while deployments have increased. With few exceptions, the increased tempo of operations is a result of non-warfighting missions. Current National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy emphasize operations other than war. Units designed to provide support in response to a WMD attack would possess significant Combat Support/Combat Service Support (CS/CSS) capabilities. By creating those units, the Army will also start to reduce the current shortfalls in CS/CSS, increase capabilities to meet operation other than war missions requirements, and reduced operation tempo due to increased deployments.

The ARNG, organized, trained and equipped for WMD homeland defense, will be more useful and better able to meet the needs of the Army, Theater Commands and National Military Strategy. It could meet the WMD threat directly with both preparedness and response. An ARNG with these expanded capabilities can also relieve some of the increasing burden being

placed on a smaller Army, and provides greater utility across the spectrum of needs for state and territorial governors.⁶³

If a WMD incident should occur, the National Guardsmen serving in a Title 32 status provide the state a readily available asset to augment the first responders. Normally within 12 hours, ARNG units can be mobilized to their armory and prepare to deploy to an incident site. In all cases, ARNG plans call for mobilizing and being prepared to deploy within 24 hours.

Congress has identified WMD homeland defense as a twofold enterprise: preparedness and response. Preparedness is defined as ensuring those who are the first to respond to a WMD incident are adequately trained for initial actions. Preparedness, as defined by the DoD, is oriented on state and local agencies and authorities who initially respond to, and manage the consequences of a WMD incidents. Response encompasses all the necessary capabilities to fully and effectively manages the consequences of a WMD attack.

The ARNG should be the force of choice for a comprehensive WMD homeland defense. It is positioned throughout the country in about 3,000 communities and maintains an infrastructure of over 16,000 facilities. The ARNG is integrated into state emergency management systems providing familiarity with state and local authorities, and detailed and coordinated planning. With the appropriate capabilities, the ARNG can provide preparedness training ensuring the readiness of first responders and initial response managers, and it can serve as the base for a rapid, coordinated and comprehensive response to a WMD incident. The ARNG's current eight combat divisions and three separate combat groups provide the manpower and structural base for a WMD homeland defense organization. The Homeland Defense Division (HDD) will be responsible for the preparedness of first responders, and planning for and responding to a WMD incident within its geographic region. Incorporation under a national Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) will allow inter-state support without federal involvement. The Homeland Defense Division will be responsible for coordination between subordinate units, and

states, in accordance with the EMAC, and establish liaison with the regional FEMA headquarters.⁶⁴

TRAINING AND EQUIPMENT

Training is one of the most important elements of WMD countermeasures. Although, many issues have been identified, there are differences of opinion of what should have a priority. More than two years ago civil support teams were established by the DoD, still there is no team certified to respond to a disaster. With twenty seven (27) support teams to be certified, it will be a while before it is completed.

Section 1412, Title XIV, directs the SECDEF to carry out a program that provides training to civilian personnel of federal, state, and local agencies. The training program is to include the use, operation, and maintenance of equipment for detecting, monitoring, protecting and decontaminating. It will also include other aspects regarding emergency responses to the use or threatened use of WMD or related materials.

Currently, the federal government offers 15 training programs to train agencies in responding to a WMD attack. An example is that Department of Energy (DoE) offers a course that provides a basic knowledge of nuclear radiation, radiation health effects and medical considerations, and nuclear weapons effects. This course is primarily given to first responders, such as physicians, emergency medical technicians and firefighters. The program also offers a joint course with the Defense Special Weapons Agency (DSWA) that teaches the DoD and the intelligence community professionals how to identify technologies associated with weapons program roles and responsibilities, and capabilities when responding to threats. The DoD also has provided training courses to first responders, such as first responder training prior to the 1996 Summer Olympics, and a course offered to civilian personnel in federal, state and local agencies at the US Army Chemical School. The four-day course, Chemical-Biological Countermeasures for First Responders, includes one day of live agent training at the Chemical

Defense Training Facility. These courses, which have been taught to civilian agencies, are being incorporated into the overall training program.

In February 1997, the DoD Program Director held four focus group meetings to determine core competencies and to develop comprehensive training performance objectives. Firefighters, hazardous materials (HAZMAT) handlers, and on-scene incident commanders; emergency medical technicians and physicians; law enforcement officials; and 911 operators and care takers, as well as the appropriate federal agencies participated in this effort. In addition, a concurrent effort was initiated to identify existing NBC training modules within DoD and other federal agencies to fulfill these training needs. Concurrent with the effort to develop the performance objectives and to identify the training modules to support them, the DoD Training Program Director developed a discussion document to assist local governments in assessing their level of training against stated performance objectives.

An initial set of performance objectives was developed at the macro level by a sub-group of the Senior Interagency Coordination Group, which consists of representatives from DoD, DoE, FBI, FEMA, PHS and EPA. A set of performance objectives at the micro level were then developed by the Chemical and Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM) in conjunction with other federal, state, and local partners. The macro and micro level performance objectives were then reviewed, commented on, and supplemented by various federal, states, and municipal emergency responders, their associations, and various training agencies through four focus group meeting conducted by CBDCOM. The four focus groups consisted of nearly 100 individuals divided into the following: (1) Firefighter, HAZMAT, and Incident Commander; (2) Law Enforcement; (3) Emergency Medical; and (4) 911 Operators. From these meetings, twenty-six performance objectives were established and the training program "took off."

The twenty-six performance objectives were organized into four competency levels with three separate levels of training (Basic, Advanced, and Specialized). These four competency levels consisted of: (1) Awareness, (2) Operations, (3) Technician/Specialist (non-medical and

medical response), and (4) Incident Command. These competencies mirror the levels identified in Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA's) 29 Code of Federal Registry (CFR). This ensured the necessary competencies would be consistent from city to city while allowing the cities to determine to which levels they needed to train their response personnel. A total of seven courses were developed for each of these categories based on the performance objectives and taking into account the different audiences and different levels of expertise. The domestic preparedness program was established with the following courses: (1) Employee Awareness, (2) Responder Awareness, (3) Responder Operations, (4) Incident Command, (5) Technician HAZMAT, (6) EMS Technician and (7) Hospital Provider.

The training program was developed as a train-the-trainer, targeting the top 120 cities in the United States to get the information to the nation's emergency responder as quickly as possible. By training the cities' trainers, they could be used as force multipliers by having them turn around and train their city's responders. The train-the-trainer concept also allows each city to decide which of their personnel would be trained as trainers and how to incorporate the training based upon their local resources.

There were five main lessons learned during the organization, identification, and development of the first responder training courses for the Domestic Preparedness Program. These lessons learned were: (1) mass casualties and mass decontamination will tax the efforts of the most capable city; (2) state, city, and regional involvement in the program will increase acceptance and approval of it; (3) team training (NBC experts teamed with emergency responder experts) approach was recognized as an important step in the credibility and development of the right instructors for the program; (4) the inclusion of the individual city's standard operating procedures, past events, training practices, and situational aspects increased the individual city's acceptance of the program; and (5) accreditation of the training will increase the medical community's participation in the program. These lessons learned have been incorporated into the Domestic Preparedness Program and have contributed to the

success that we have experienced in the six cities that received the training--Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Chicago, New York, and Los Angeles.⁶⁵

In addition to the individual training plans designed for selected cities and states, the DoD Program Director has designed low cost training packages, which have received wide dissemination via an inexpensive media. This training initiative has made these packages available to state and local agencies. The DoD CD-ROM entitled "Management of Chemical Warfare Injuries" provides:

- Self-test for evaluating mastery of key learning objectives.
- Dramatized scenarios offering opportunities for practicing differential diagnoses of patients.
- Extensive reference materials.
- Technical information on chemical warfare agents (i.e., nerve, blister, choking and riot control agents, and cyanides).

Another CD-ROM entitled "Medical Management of Biological Casualties" provides:

- Dual learning tracks (one for medical professionals such as physicians, nurses, and physician assistants; and one for first responders such as military medics, emergency medical technicians, and paramedics)
- Physiology, and signs and symptoms of exposure to those biological warfare agents identified by United States Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Disease (USAMRIID) as posing the greatest threat to military personnel (bacteria: anthrax, plague, tularemia, Q fever; viruses: smallpox, Venezuelan equine encephalitis, viral hemorrhagic fever; and toxins: *botulinum*, staphylococcal exenterotoxin B, *ricin*, *tricothecene mycotoxins*)
- Self-test for evaluating mastery of key learning objective.

- Dramatized scenarios offering opportunities for practicing differential diagnoses of patients.
- Extensive reference materials.⁶⁶

Training and exercises are the two components of the overall training program. Achieving a level of enhanced readiness is directly linked to both. The challenge is to utilize the limited resources available during the development phases through a rigorous training and exercise program. Training must be conducted to ensure an effective response. Exercises offer an opportunity to practice response operations and to validate training preparations. Ultimately the real test will be when the first unit responds to an event – turning victims into patients rather than collecting casualties for body bags.

This challenge is complicated by the fact that this effort is evolutionary. Training instruction must focus on the unique aspects of a domestic WMD response. On the surface, responding to civilian casualties in a downtown metropolitan area would seem to have similar tasks that a soldier would perform when responding to a fellow member on the battlefield. The key difference is in the emergency operational environment. One is a wartime theater and the other is just as chaotic, just as lethal but CONUS based. Yet, the specific conditions may vary greatly given the unique nature of a WMD attack in a CONUS setting.⁶⁷

Individual training, in particular first responder training, is viewed as the single most critical area for enhancing the nation's capability to respond to domestic terrorism. This training addresses the competence of skills needed to execute WMD response missions. There does exist a training gap between battlefield skills and the unique response skills required for civil WMD missions. In addition to providing individual training for teams, awareness training to the entire RC community will enhance our nation's overall response capability. Awareness training linked to ongoing unit training is delivered using distance learning technology.

Training for some units will require a focus on new and different tasks in order to prepare for a WMD response. Many of these tasks are complementary to the unit's mission while some

tasks have a new focus. Unit training builds on the individual skill proficiency to achieve unit domestic readiness. Rigorous training exercises are most appropriate for units with a WMD mission. These exercises require an understanding of the critical infrastructure nodes and emergency response protocols within the state and local communities to allow response units to refine "battle drill" techniques. The focus of unit training should provide immediate feedback to participants which reinforces individual skills training.

Unit NBC Defense Teams provide a WMD response capability as well. These teams are trained today for their military NBC mission and a basic orientation on the unique WMD task necessary. In addition, training exercises should be conducted to allow the teams, elements and units to practice for the WMD mission. A critical step in the process is learning the roles and responsibilities that individuals will assume should an actual incident occur. These exercises provide the opportunity to practice and develop skills as well as foster teamwork among responders and between agencies. Also these exercises ensure that a crisis is not the first opportunity for interagency coordination among responders. Finally, exercises complement and enhance training activities.

There also exist Regional Training Exercises that bring all regional responders together to a training incident and evaluate the entire response. The exercise is a joint, city, state and federal effort. The leadership of these organizations should have completed a WMD Simulation Training Exercise (SIMEX) prior to a regional training exercise in order to maximize the benefit of the training event.

Training materials are provided in advance to selected audience. Civic leader chooses tasks they wish to exercise. Training scenarios pull together the interagency team in a focused training exercise that allows them to operate together to reduce and mitigate the effects of a WMD. Teams will test emergency response plans and coordination of responsibilities through realistic execution, which will serve as the basis for formulation and testing alternatives to

developing capabilities. Finally, an after-action review process will emphasize lessons learned and a take home packet will provide direction for future interagency training events.

The first responders; police, firemen and emergency first aid personnel, will become casualties themselves if not trained to identify WMD characteristics. This training can be provided by the military. The military conducts chemical training as an integrated piece of their overall program. The ARNG, as the primary reserve of the active RC, also conducts this training. In addition, the ARNG, through its military role, has a relationship with the Chemical Biological Defense Command (CBDCOM), the lead federal element in preparing chemical biological training. This relationship will allow the ARNG access to the current program of instruction concerning chemical and biological weapons.

Due to its primary state mission to provide trained personnel and resources to the Governor during emergencies, the ARNG has an established relationship with the first responders. This relationship provides support for the ARNG to provide WMD training to the first responders. With more than 4,200 units in more than 3,000 communities, the ARNG inherently has readily available training facilities. These armories have all the necessary equipment, classrooms, audiovisual aids, and work areas to support emergency requirements; facilities that the ARNG use to train regularly for its mission.

The USAR has a network of seven institutional training and five exercise divisions that allows U.S. Army Reserve Command (USARC) to train new soldiers during mobilization and provide valuable peacetime training for active and reserve soldiers. The USARC also supervises specific troop units such as military police and signal commands through a system of 25 General Officer Commands.

Army reservists train at installations controlled and managed by the USARC. Several posts, including Fort McCoy, WI., Fort Hunter-Leggett, Cal., Camp Parks, Cal., and Fort Dix, NJ., will become regional training sites for all three components of America's Army. These training centers will support field and computer simulated training.

The USAR participated in a major exercise designed to provide WMD response training to civil and military authorities and to demonstrate the capabilities of local, state and federal agencies to coordinate emergency response to domestic terrorism. The exercise, known as "Consequence Management 2000," was conducted from May 15-20, 2000, at the Regional Training Site-Medical, at Fort Gordon, Georgia. The scenario during Consequence Management 2000 was a simulated terrorist attack affecting a federal building in the United States. The development of the training exercise was a joint effort of the USARC, Department of Veterans Affairs, U.S. Air Force Reserve Command, Southeast Regional Medical Command, U.S. Public Health Service and other DoD, state and local government participants.

The exercise was designed primarily for federal emergency medical response team personnel whose duties encompass a WMD-related emergency. The exercise was also designed to familiarize federal, state, and local emergency agencies with the capabilities of the USAR in support of the federal response to WMD incidents. The USAR will be the provider of most of the medical and chemical responses.

Modeling and simulation tools have been developed for Major Theater Warfare scenarios using current AC and RC data. These models can be adapted to scenarios, which impact the civilian populace at large. The data generated from these models can produce hazard effects, which would be useful identifying "hot zones", evacuation areas and safe areas. Reports generated from these databases instantaneously identify units within the geographic proximity of an event by zip code. This has been helpful for identifying gaps in the existing capability. More importantly, it has helped to facilitate decisions about fielding force structure that could be used to fill current force structure gaps.

The two agencies that have provided the most invaluable help to the Tiger Team are the Concepts Analysis Agency and the Defense Special Weapons Agency. These teams were initially set up to provide the recommendation for WMD awareness, and the direction in which the process would proceed. Each of these organizations has extensive experience in

developing modeling and simulations for the DoD. Furthermore, each organization has the technical expertise to assist the future efforts of the program office in many ways including doctrine and training development. Areas of interest for the program office include: determine WMD impact, number of casualties in a contaminated area, downwind hazard, areas to avoid and evacuate, neutralization procedures, analyze and determine tasks and their priority, and estimate response force size and composition.

If simulations and models are used properly, an environment that stresses the need for effective response options can be created. Proper use also ensures quality training that can compensate for fiscal constraint that limits live exercises. In addition, modeling and simulations efforts will provide leaders at all levels effective training alternatives.⁶⁸

Equipment is also important in the WMD domestic preparedness process. Although DoD has a program for loaning equipment to civilian agencies, personal protective equipment such as the mask or protective suit, if adapted for civilian use, would require National Institute For Occupational Safety and Health or National Fire Protection Association approval.

The annual report to Congress entitled "Department of Defense Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Warfare Defense" submitted as required by Section 1703 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994 documents quantities, characteristics, and capabilities of fielded chemical and biological defense equipment that would be used in an NBC combat scenario.⁶⁹

The FBI and FEMA, as lead federal agencies in domestic terrorist incidents, should procure WMD protective equipment, detection and identification capabilities, and immunizations through the DoD. Other federal, state and local agencies tasked to respond to WMD incidents could also procure common equipment and parts through the DoD and receive training at the U.S. Army Chemical School. Training and equipping all the response forces with common tactics, techniques, procedures, and equipment is a vital step in enhancing interoperability and support between government agencies.⁷⁰

ORGANIZATION AND STRUCTURE FOR WMD HOMELAND DEFENSE

Statutes prohibit designing military forces exclusively for domestic use. The reality of the threat posed by WMD, and the expectations of Congress and the public, though, require a reorientation and adjustment within the DoD. An appropriately designed organization can provide extensive national security for homeland defense and meet larger world-wide needs of Army and theater commands. It should address threats posed by WMD and make up identified CS/CSS shortfalls in overall Army capabilities. A comprehensive homeland defense structure should build upon current initiatives to the maximum degree feasible, but not avoid revolutionary changes that can better meet the needs of national security strategy.

The expansion of technical capabilities in the active forces encompassed in the U.S. Army Chemical Biological Rapid Response Team and U.S. Marine Corps Chemical Biological Incident Response Force is conceptually sound, and meets immediate national needs. The improved capabilities of these units, and residual effects expected to be incorporated into the Armed Forces at large, are also necessary for military operations in any nuclear, biological or chemical environment. These units, however, are designed to meet only small-scale contingencies and cannot meet larger national security requirements posed by the WMD threat. Similarly, the establishment of the civil support elements provide a vital and needed capability. The limit of ten elements nationwide, and residence in the ARNG, impede responsiveness and require federal action for response outside of the state to which assigned. However, with the change over to civil support teams, an additional 17, bringing the total to 27, will vastly enhance response capabilities.

The ARNG is integrated into state emergency management systems providing familiarity with state and local authorities, and detailed and coordinated planning. With the appropriate capabilities, the ARNG can provide preparedness training ensuring the readiness of first responder and initial response managers, and it can serve as the base for a rapid, coordinated and comprehensive response to a WMD incident. The ARNG reorganized to provide

comprehensive WMD homeland defense, and also offers increased utility across the spectrum of domestic needs as recommended by RAND Corporation and the National Academy for Public Assistance (NAPA).

The ARNG's current eight combat divisions and three separate combat groups provide the manpower and structural base for a WMD homeland defense organization. None of these combat formations are written into any war plans, including the two most dangerous major theater war scenarios, making them reasonably available for reorganization. Re-designation as a HDD, a capability shift to combat support and combat service support units, and alignment to coincide with FEMA regions, provides the capabilities and organization needed to comprehensively meet the WMD threat. The HDD will be responsible for the preparedness of the first responders, planning for, and responding to a WMD incident within its geographic region. Incorporation under a national Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) will allow inter-state support without federal involvement. The Homeland Defense Division will be responsible for coordination between subordinate units and states in accordance with the EMAC, and establish liaison with the regional FEMA headquarters.

Division capabilities should coincide with those identified in the FEMA Federal Response Plan, the DoD NG/RC Integration Plan and the RAND disaster relief study. Brigades and battalions should be structured around CS/CSS units essential for WMD homeland defense and other domestic support missions. Greater emphasis can then be placed on WMD-related requirements throughout the division, such as mass contaminated casualty treatment, handling and evacuation; large scale decontamination; and provision of vital services in an urban NBC, environment.

Units will be assigned and distributed along the force structure lines commensurate with those of the current divisions and separate combat units. It is not possible for each state to have all of the capabilities within each division; however, each state will have those capabilities determined to be essential for immediate actions in WMD incident. Remaining capabilities will

be distributed within the division's region to provide balance for a response to a WMD attack, and rapid cross-state support and reinforcement. CS/CSS skills lend themselves to platoon-level and below proficiency and employment. This facilitates dispersal throughout the division, and enables effective employment without dependency on higher headquarters. Higher level formations, such as companies, battalions and brigades, will build upon these dispersed platoons as situations or tasking develops. As such, capabilities can be widely dispersed among states and regions, ensuring reasonable wide coverage and response to emergencies.

WMD homeland defense will be multi-level and cover all aspects of disaster relief requirements. The State Area Command (STARC) will maintain its current authority and responsibility over assigned National Guard forces within the states. The STARC will coordinate and conduct first responder training and other actions envisioned for WMD preparedness, as well as developing state plans for WMD consequence management. STARC will exercise command and control over state ARNG units employed internally, and provide the State Coordinating Officer forces being provided from the associated HDD to support state managed emergencies. STARC will exercise command and control over civil support elements; however, the civil support elements will provide simultaneous reports to their division headquarters to expedite mobilization of its units.

At the next higher level, HDD will be responsible for regional planning support to each STARC and the FEMA regional headquarters Liaison officers and command and control links will be provided to each STARC and the FEMA headquarters. Under the provisions of the EMAC, the division will initially respond to a WMD incident before federal assistance can be organized. The HDD will provide the Defense Coordinating Officer (DCO) and provide command and control over all military support flowing in from outside the region, Reserve and Active Component forces alike. The DCO is normally a federally assigned military officer. The shift to assigning the DCO from the HDD will ensure better support to local and state governments being provided federal military assistance in an emergency.

The division commander will be responsible to the SECDEF for managing DoD support in a federal response. By using the HDD and its headquarters in that role, those responsible for military support will be familiar with all agencies in the region, have visibility and access to all division and incoming federal resources, and will be intimately knowledgeable with emergency plans. The division will be responsible for coordinating and employing its resources to support states within its region during state emergencies. This new command and control arrangement ensures responsiveness, thoroughness, continuity and familiarity as emergency situations develop.

The division will also be responsible for coordinating missions assigned to its units with federal authorities. This would include forming task forces with headquarters elements for missions outside of its region, including overseas deployments. Once established, HDD can assume even greater internal security responsibilities such as those established in the Continuity of Operations and the Critical Asset Assurance Programs.

The key to the HDD is the ARNG's familiarity and habitual association with civil agencies and resident infrastructure. They can ensure mutual support and full integration of ARNG resources with state and local civil authorities, and between each STARC and the FEMA headquarters in the region. The division can also provide extensive and detailed planning and preparation, and a rapid, comprehensive response to a WMD attack.

ARNG Homeland Defense Divisions will address all of the concerns and shortfalls identified in the NG/RC Integration Plan. This is a revolutionary change and will meet WMD CQM response requirements, general domestic support needs and provide comprehensive support to national military strategy.

The current DoD plan for response to a WMD attack has distinctly limited capabilities and requires significant bureaucratic actions for activation. ARNG HDD, can provide comprehensive WMD defense; enable a tiered, flexible response for any domestic emergency; or provide a mobilization base for task organized, packaged CS/CSS capabilities to meet Army deployment

requirements. The combination of the proposed restructuring of this new ARNG division and the Guard's inherent characteristics and strengths offers a solution that is far superior to any concept presented today for response to WMD. The National Guard is uniquely positioned to meet most pressing needs of national defense with a legitimate return to its roots of defending the homeland.⁷¹

CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL RAPID RESPONSE

BACKGROUND AND DISCUSSION

As with other WMD directives, the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996, Section 1414 of Public Law 104-201, and the FY 1997 Defense Authorization Act, require the DoD to develop and maintain a domestic terrorism rapid response team capable of aiding federal, state and local officials in responding to incidents involving WMD, containing chemical and biological or related materials. The SECDEF designated the SECARMY as the Executive Agent for the development of the team. The U.S. Army Materiel Command (AMC) was tasked with the responsibility of organizing the CB-RRT for the purpose of assisting the unified CINCs and the lead federal agency (LFA) in this effort. The responsibility for providing the required concept and organizing the CB-RRT was further delegated to the Commander, U.S. Army Soldier and Biological Chemical Command (SBCCOM), as the DoD program director for the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction Act of 1996.

The CB-RRT was established to assume the mission of coordinating and managing the DoD technical capabilities necessary to respond to a Chemical Biological (CB) terrorist incident. By coordinating the technical CB defense capabilities, the CB-RRT serves a critical role in the overall DoD response plan to provide DoD support to civil authorities in the event of a CB terrorist incident. The CB-RRT is composed of members of the Armed Forces and employees of DoD who are capable of providing technical assistance to aid federal, state and local officials in the response to, and mitigation of, incidents involving WMD containing chemical or biological

materials. Another role of the CB-RRT is to provide the capabilities to aid in the detection, neutralization, containment, dismantlement, and disposal of WMD containing chemical, biological or related hazardous materials.

After the initial laws and additional guidance, the FBI was selected as the LFA for crisis management of a terrorist attack involving nuclear, chemical or biological weapons. The FBI's lead agency responsibility encompasses resolving hostile situations, investigating the incident, and preparing a criminal case for prosecution. Their lead role in this situation stems from the fact that such incidents will have law enforcement implications, and the bureau has the requisite capability to manage an event from the federal law enforcement perspective.

The FEMA is the LFA responsible for managing the consequences of a terrorist incident within the United States. Although affected state and local governments have primary responsibility for emergencies, a terrorist attack with WMD involves circumstances requiring capabilities and technical expertise that can overcome the capabilities at the local and state level. To augment the capabilities found at the state and local level, FEMA coordinates federal measures to aid the on-scene officials through the Federal Response Plan. Other federal agencies such as DoD, Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS), as well as Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and others will assist in this effort.

During situations involving known national security special events, the LFA in most cases is the U.S. Secret Service (USSS). Other federal agencies involved in a known national security special event may be the FBI, FEMA, U.S. Customs Service (USCS), DHHS, Department of State (DoS), and others. The supported CINC's Response Task Force (RTA), when activated, will coordinate directly with the LFA, and CB-RRT will coordinate CB response capabilities under the operational control of the RTF.⁷²

The USAR has special capabilities it can bring to bear. Among its over 2,000 units are chemical detection and reconnaissance companies, a myriad of medical and medical support organizations and a number of other groups with specialized functions that may counter the

effects of weapons of mass destruction and other forms of terrorism. The two largest capabilities the Army Reserve will bring to the table for civil support are its chemical and medical assets. It has a biological detection system, which can alert the presence of biological weapons.

The chemical and medical forces of the USAR represent the largest proportion of its total assets. These are some of their largest units, and some of the most highly specialized units needed for WMD CQM. The Army Reserve has 59 percent of the medical assets and 63 percent of the chemical assets in the U.S. Army.

The USAR also has one of the Army's two Biological Integrated Detection Systems (BIDS) companies, based in Anniston, AL. The centerpieces of these companies are 35 individual systems that can be deployed to "sniff" the air, filtering out non-toxic impurities, and detecting and identifying a variety of common biological agents.⁷³

COMMAND AND CONTROL

The SBCCOM Commander has the overall responsibility for the CB-RRT. Once the CB-RRT is notified of a mission, he will either assume command of the CB-RRT or appoint a field grade officer as the mission commander. When a mission is received, the CB-RRT will task organize to respond to the mission (assigned by the supported CINC) to support federal, state and local agencies. The CB-RRT will be under the operational control (OPCON) of the supported CINC, the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF), or the RTF as directed. There are two RTFs organized under Atlantic Command (ACOM): RTF-East and RTF-West. In carrying out the mission requirements of the supported CINC and LFA, the CB-RRT may establish operations at three locations: CB -RRT (Rear) will be under the control of the SBCCOM operations Center Director, who serves to maintain the current mission situation and coordinates and manages technical and support requirements necessary for continuity of main and forward operations. The CB-RRT (Main) will be under the command of a field grade officer,

such as the SBCCOM Deputy for Stockpile and Operations. He serves as the operational commander of the CB-RRT for direct mission support and will manage the CB-RRT elements and technical requirements of the mission. The CB-RRT (Forward) will be under the control of the senior CB-RRT element commander such, as the chemical activity commander, or the senior CB-RRT asset commander responding to the tactical mission.⁷⁴

FEDERAL, STATE AND LOCAL INTEGRATION

The Presidential Decision Directive 39 entitled, "U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism", recognizes that there must be a rapid and decisive capability to protect U.S. citizens, defeat or arrest terrorists, respond against terrorist sponsors, and provide relief to victims. The goals during the immediate response phase of an incident are to terminate the terrorist attack so that terrorists do not accomplish their objectives or maintain their freedom, to minimize loss of life and damage, and to provide emergency assistance to the affected area.

Local response to an emergency situation uses the Incident Command System (ICS) to ensure that all responders and their support assets are coordinated for an effective and efficient response. The Incident Commander is normally the senior responder of the organization with the preponderance of responsibility for the event, such as the fire chief, police chief, or emergency medical personnel. If local assets are not sufficient to meet the emergency response requirements, they request state or regional assets through the State Office of Emergency Services.

The state's substantial resources, including the National Guard, are coordinated per their response plans normally through the Office of Emergency Services. If state assets are not sufficient to meet the emergency response requirements, they request federal assets through the FEMA Regional Operations Center.

In September 1996, the National Governors' Association (NGA) conducted a workshop for the NGA's policy advisors with representatives from FEMA, DoD, DoE, EPA, FBI, Department of

Health and Human Services (DHHS), and the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA). The workshop sought to identify the nature, impact, and response issues associated with a nuclear, biological or chemical terrorist incident; discuss the adequacy of both federal and state plans and response capabilities to an incident involving mass casualties; and formulate the next steps for developing a coordinated federal, state, and local response framework.

Participants believed that local government had the ability to meet normal emergency response needs by performing the fire-fighting, law enforcement, emergency medical services and rescue tasks they do so effectively on a day-to-day basis. In addition, some personnel protective equipment and some hazardous materials response equipment is generally in place at the local level and would be available to respond to a very small WMD incident. However, they identified a critical need for access to information and expert advice as well as training. They thought that local government was ready, willing and able to do more with the proper training and equipment.

Participants highlighted training as a key component in building local, state, and federal response capabilities. First responders need awareness training specific to NBC hazards so that they could quickly recognize victim symptoms and other characteristics of such an incident, which distinguishes it from other hazardous material incidents. Participants also felt that first responders needed training on routes of exposure, means of protection, health effects, treatment and monitoring, and decontamination methods. Training on handling of mass casualties and on the requirements of triage were also highlighted as a need for the emergency medical community.

The work groups noted that multi-jurisdictional exercises were another critical element of the preparedness program that was currently missing. They felt that local plans and procedures were evaluated on a frequent basis, but that opportunities to test integration and coordination with state and federal agencies were lacking. The groups encouraged the federal government to promote more full-scale integrated exercises. Overall, the group consensus was that the

local preparedness for response to WMD terrorist incidents is nominal. To the extent that hazardous material preparedness applies to the NBC arena, they felt some base level exists.

The groups also highlighted the need for subject matter experts to be identified and available within the first few hours of an incident. These subject matter experts would provide advice and reference material describing the hazards, the effects and recommended protective response actions.

Beyond technical experts, personnel resources would be required by local governments to assist with the potentially massive public impacts of such incidents – whether it is mass casualties or large-scale evacuation. ARNG, state police, and additional fire and emergency medical personnel from outlying municipalities were noted as probable sources to meet these needs. The cities indicated that in many cases mutual aid agreements were in place to obtain resources from neighboring communities. In other cases, they recognized the need for such agreements and that this was a local responsibility.

The National Governors' Association (NGA), in preparation for the workshop conducted a survey of the 26 participating states to assess the capabilities of these states to respond to and manage the consequences of nuclear, biological, or chemical (NBC) terrorism. These 26 states were chosen because their large urban areas and other factors could make them potential targets for a terrorist incident.

Most states acknowledge that they receive satisfactory intelligence about potential terrorist groups operating in their state and could adequately respond to a nuclear terrorist attack due to their planning and training for possible nuclear power plant accidents. However, in the arena of chemical and biological terrorist, the states felt they were not adequately resourced or trained. The NGA findings indicate a need for more information on the types of resources available to combat chemical or biological attacks and indicated a need for federal assistance in areas of monitoring and detection equipment, technical assistance, manpower, and recovery efforts.

When discussing how the states and federal agencies could best work together on the issue of NBC terrorism, most states suggested the FEMA should hold regional meetings. To develop a coordinated framework for states and federal agencies to work together, FEMA proposed imitating the Federal Response Plan (FRP) review process at the state level; hosting a series of workshops at the regional level; establishing a national information clearinghouse; visiting and assisting each reviewing state; pooling federal and state capabilities data; developing a national plan outlining state and federal responsibilities, priorities, and approaches to develop and sustain capability; securing state and federal funding support; and implementing a multi-year plan.⁷⁵

The success of federal, state, and local integration of all aspects of the WMD domestic preparedness process will depend widely on how well they work together and are prepared, both fiscally and managerially. One can assume that small communities will not be affected by the threat of terrorism, and as such, they will not be prepared. This action could be the weak link in the chain. The LFA should take special care to ensure state and local agencies are all included in the preparedness training and meetings because a small town could be the next target for a terrorist attack.

CONCLUSIONS

Weapons of Mass Destruction are a valid threat, the consequences of which currently exceed the nation's ability to respond. Addressing the requirements created by the threat of WMD is complex and the consequences of an incident are potentially staggering. Thus, preparing a comprehensive defense requires governments at all levels to commit significant resources to preparedness and response. Most of the solutions to the present state of non-preparedness are too conservative and based on outmoded thinking. Current efforts to provide for homeland defense fill only short-term needs.

Current efforts to develop limited technical capabilities are dispersed throughout the military components, and under disparate authorities. The other extensive capabilities needed to deal with the WMD threat are similarly organized. Although this approach addresses some immediate shortfalls in the nation's defenses, this present solution is an impediment to the development of a comprehensive and extensive response to meet this threat over the long run.

Additionally, competition between various agencies for access to and control of these limited resources during a national mobilization will produce confusion and delay, while leaving significant portions of the United States or major military commands at risk. To properly provide the effective, comprehensive WMD homeland defense expected by the American public, there must be significant changes made to current organizations and plans, as well as the reallocation of resources committed to this purpose.⁷⁶

The growing importance of homeland defense will task the ARNG with new responsibilities, roles, and missions. This is quite evident in the Report to Congress. The ARNG is actively using its Distributive Training Technology Program in support of these on-going initiatives, the DoD WMD program as a whole, and future National Guard roles or missions. The National Guard is standing ready to do more, but it also realizes the enormous resource impacts on future programs and resource shortfalls of current programs.⁷⁷

The ARNG is the right organization to assume this mission by both tradition and design. Positioned in communities throughout the nation and holding a natural affiliation with state and local agencies and authorities, the ARNG provides a sound foundation for genuine defense against WMD. The enhanced readiness brigades and ARNG role as the Army's primary combat reserve are well protected by statute, policy and war plans. Thus, the ARNG will have the longevity and structure to successfully develop the needed skills and organization. The DoD and the ARNG must commit themselves to a fundamental restructuring of those combat forces that are not needed in existing war plans and are continuously identified by Congress and the DoD as excess.

The ARNG prominence in homeland defense against non-traditional threats should then rise within DoD and the nation. This prominence should be welcomed in a period of budget reductions. Prominence will ultimately be predicated upon legitimate utility, not tradition. The security of the nation and its ability to respond to disasters, natural and manmade, will be enhanced by developing the ARNG's ability to provide homeland defense. Moreover, ARNG relevance and utility well into the next century may depend on how it responds to this opportunity.⁷⁸

The DoD is fully committed through the broad spectrum of combating terrorism activities to deter attacks against U.S. personnel and facilities, and to respond rapidly and decisively when directed by the national command authorities during incidents involving acts or threats of terrorism. The DoD has always had a supporting role to the applicable lead federal agency, when providing military assistance to civil authorities to mitigate the consequences of terrorist attacks. Although the DoD has made substantial progress, effective response to terrorism will remain a challenge as the array of individuals and organizations (independent and state sponsored) that can affect US security and international stability continue to grow in number and competence. WMD attacks may be directed against US citizens and facilities abroad and also here in the United States. U.S. long-term strategy must address the vulnerabilities of the nation, while ensuring the military preparedness of its armed forces and long-standing tradition of respect for civil liberties.⁷⁹

When President Clinton completed his term in office, he could claim credit for having done more than any other president to ensure that the United States was prepared to counter the threat of terrorism. Overall spending on preparedness and response measures nearly doubled, and terrorism was elevated to the top of the list of security threats confronting the United States.

Yet, despite all this progress, the attack on the USS Cole tragically demonstrates that U.S. capabilities to defend itself against terrorism, and to pre-empt or respond to attacks, remain unfocused. Construction of an effective counter-terrorism policy is not a question of more

attention, big budgets and increased staff. Rather, it requires greater focus, a better appreciation of the problem and understanding of the threat, and in turn, the development of a clear strategy. This is not simply an intellectual exercise. It is the very foundation of any effective counter-terrorism efforts of the United States and other democratic nations before, producing frustratingly, if not sometimes negative effects. In some cases, it actually increased the threat of terrorism.

For example, as satisfying or cathartic as retaliating against terrorism might be, it can have the opposite effect: provoking escalation rather than curtailing terrorist attacks. The 1986 U.S. air strikes on Libya are a case in point. Rather than deterring Moammar Gadhafi, the attacks goaded him to further excesses, including, it is believed, the in-flight bombing of Pan Am 103 two years later. This is not to suggest that the United States shouldn't forcefully respond to terrorism, but that such actions must be planned and orchestrated as part of a wider, well-developed strategy designed to achieve long-term objectives and not simply to satisfy immediate desires. The current administration must turn its immediate attention to knitting together the full range of U.S. counter-terrorist capabilities into a cohesive plan.

A critical first step is a comprehensive assessment of the terrorist threat, both foreign and domestic. There has been no such assessment for at least the past five years. Moreover, no mechanism exists to assess the domestic threat.

The current administration must be confident that the United States is capable of responding to all types of terrorist threats, from relatively simple and unsophisticated explosive devices to biological weapons, with equal emphasis given to conventional, yet lethal events such as the attack on the USS Cole. A former secretary of Navy, for example, was among those who described the attack on the USS Cole as an "obscene failure of intelligence." Such accusations ignore the intelligence community's highly commendable track record in thwarting a succession of anti-American terrorist acts here and abroad.

The United States has long relied on the use of military force and economic sanctions to counter terrorism. But these options were directed almost exclusively against, and are largely applicable to, state sponsors of terrorism. They are unsuitable for non-state, transnational terrorist movements such as the Qaeda movement, which is closely associated with Osama bin Laden. To counter these groups, the new counter-terrorist strategy should incorporate psychological and communications strategies that aim to wean support and sympathy from those who threaten this country.

Terrorism is not a problem that can be solved, much less completely eradicated. Nor can any society hope to insulate itself from any and every manifestation of this threat. By the same token, the threat of terrorism must be kept in perspective. There is a thin line between prudence and panic. A prerequisite to ensuring that U.S. resources are focused on a sober and empirical understanding of the terrorist threat, coupled with comprehensive strategy.⁸⁰

ENDNOTES

¹ Eric K. Shinseki, "Intent of the Chief of Staff, Army," 23 June 1999; available from <<http://hqda.army.mil/ocsa/intent.ppt>>; Internet. accessed 28 September 2000.

² William S. Cohen, "Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress," Department of Defense, 2000.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Joe Harkey, "Integration of The Army National Guard into The Army Acquisition Corps: Future Prospective," (Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP), United States Army War College, 2000)

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ William S. Cohen, "Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress." Department of Defense, 2000.

⁸ "Defense Policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction," 18 June 1998; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet; accessed 6 September 2000.

⁹ Joe Harkey, "Integration of the Army National Guard in the Army Acquisition Corps: Future Prospective." (Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP), United States Army War College, 2000)

¹⁰ Ibid.

¹¹ Eric K. Shinseki, "Intent of the Chief of Staff, Army," 23 June 1999; available from <<http://hqda.army.mil/ocsa/intent.ppt>>; Internet. Accessed 6 September 2000.

¹² Joe Harkey, "Integration of The Army National Guard into The Army Acquisition Corps: Future Prospective," (Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP), United States Army War College, 2000)

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ "Army National Guard History," 23 November 1999; available from <<http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/home/History/history.htm>>; Internet; accessed 30 August 2000.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ "Army National Guard History." 23 November 1999; available from
<<http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/home/History/history.htm>>; Internet; accessed 30 August 2000.

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ "Army National Guard History." 23 November 1999; available from
<<http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/home/History/history.htm>>; Internet; accessed 30 August 2000.

²¹ Ibid.

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ "Army National Guard History." 23 November 1999; available from
<<http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/home/History/history.htm>>; Internet; accessed 30 August 2000.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ "Army Guard Information Page." 23 November 1999; available from
<<http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/History/history.htm>>; Internet; accessed 30 August 2000.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Joe Harkey, "Integration of The Army National Guard into Army Acquisition Corps: Future Prospective," (Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP), United States Army War College, 2000), 6.

³¹ "Army Guard Information Page." 23 November 1999; available from
<<http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/History/history.htm>>; Internet; accessed 30 August 2000.

³² Ibid.

³³ Austin R. Omlie and Terry R. Council, "Requirements Assessment and Integration of the United States Army Reserve and the Army National Guard into the Army Acquisition Corps," (Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP), United States Army War College, 1997).

³⁴ "Army Guard Information Page." 23 November 1999; available from
<<http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil.History/history.htm>>; Internet; accessed 30 August 2000.

³⁵ Austin R. Omlie and Terry R. Council, "Requirements Assessment and Integration of the United States Army Reserve and the Army National Guard into the Army Acquisition Corps," (Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP), United States Army War College, 1997).

³⁶ "Army Guard Information Page." 23 November 1999; available from <<http://www,arng.nbg.army.mil.History/history.htm>>; Internet, accessed 30 August 2000.

³⁷ "American Forces Information Service: Milestones on the Road to Integration." 14 February 2000; available from <<http://vsearch.dtic.mil/search97/s97is.v;...>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ "Report of The Chairman of The Reserve Forces Policy Board," 1 March 1999; available from <<http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr1999/rfpbstat.htm>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, "Report of The Quadrennial Defense Review," 1 MAY 1997; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ Ibid., 11.

⁴⁴ Ibid., 11.

⁴⁵ "American Forces Information Service: Milestones on The Road to Integration." 14 February 2000; available from <<http://vsearch.dtic.mil/search97/98is.v...>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ William S. Cohen, Secretary of Defense, "Report of The Quadrennial Defense Review," 1 May 1997; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/qdr>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ "White Paper, "National Guard's Role in a Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident." 17 March 1999; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubsdomestic>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ "The National Guard Study: Fact Sheet No. 2." April 1998; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ "White Paper, "National Guard's Role in a Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident." 17 March 1999; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubsdomestic>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

⁵⁴ "American Forces Information Service: Weapons of Mass Destruction Threat Grows." 12 February 1999; available from <<http://vsearch.dtic.mil/search97/s97is.v...>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

⁵⁵ "White Paper, "National Guard's Role in a Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident." 17 March 1999; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

⁵⁶ "John J. Hamre, Deputy Secretary of Defense," Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction; 26 January 1998.

⁵⁷ "White Paper, "National Guard's Role in a Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident." 17 March 1999; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubsdomestic>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ "Department of Defense: Reserve Integration Moves Forward With Establishment of Consequence Management Program Integration Office." 18 May 1998; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/>>; Internet accessed 6 September 2000.

⁶⁰ "American Forces Information Service: Guard Reserve to Take On New Role." 17 June 1998; available from <<http://vsearch.dtic.mil/search97/s97>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² "White Paper, National Guard's Role in a Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident." 17 March 1999; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubsdomestic>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid., 24.

⁶⁵ William S. Cohen, "Secretary of Defense Report to Congress Domestic Preparedness Program In the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction." 1 May 1997; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet accessed 6 September 2000.

⁶⁶ Ibid.

⁶⁷ "Defense Link, U.S. Department of Defense: Defense Policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)." 18 June 1998; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/issues/wmd.htm>>; Internet accessed 6 September 2000.

⁶⁸ Ibid.

⁶⁹ "William S. Cohen, "Secretary of Defense Report to Congress Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction. " 1 May 1997; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet accessed 6 September 2000.

⁷⁰ Michael T. Brown, "Terrorist use of Weapons of Mass Destruction Within the United States: Asymmetric Warfare Paradigm in the 21st Century," (Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP), United States Army War College, 1997).

⁷¹ "White Paper, "National Guard's Role in a Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident" 17 March 1999; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubsdomestic>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.

⁷² "Department of Defense: "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.7." 3 July 2000; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet, accessed 10 October 2000.

⁷³ "United States Army: "Army Reserve Gear up for Civil Support Mission" 22 March 2000; available from <<http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/news>>; Internet, accessed 9 November 2000.

⁷⁴ "Department of Defense: "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.7." 3 July 2000; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet, accessed 10 October 2000.

⁷⁵ "William S. Cohen, "Secretary of Defense Report to Congress Domestic Preparedness Program in the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction." 1 May 1997; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet accessed 6 September 2000.

⁷⁶ "White Paper, "National Guard Role in a Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident" 17 March 1999; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet, accessed 9 November 2000.

⁷⁷ "Background Paper, "National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Program" 29 April 1999; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubsdomestic>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 1999.

⁷⁸ "White Paper, "National Guard's Role in a Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident:" 17 March 1999; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubsdomestic>>; Internet accessed 6 September 2000.

⁷⁹ "Brain Sheridan, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operation and Low-Intensity Conflict Before The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Of The Committee On Armed Services." 24 March 2000; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil>>; Internet accessed 9 November 2000.

⁸⁰ Harold Gater, The Clarion-Ledger. "Perspective, U.S. Anti-terrorism Effort Lacking," 20 November 2000; available from <<http://www.clarionledger.com>>; Internet, accessed 27 November 2000.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "American Forces Information Service: Milestones on the Road to Integration." 14 February 2000; available from <<http://vsearch.dtic.mil/search97/s97is.v;...>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.
- "Army Guard Information Page." 23 November 1999; available from <<http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/history/history.htm>>; Internet, accessed 30 August 2000.
- "Army National Guard History," 23 November 1999; available from <<http://www.arng.ngb.army.mil/home/History/history.htm>>; Internet; accessed 30 August 2000.
- "Background Paper, "National Guard Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident" 17 March 1999; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil.pubsdomestic>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 1999.
- "Brown, Michael T. "Terrorist use of Weapons of Mass Destruction within the United States: Asymmetric Warfare Paradigm in the 21st Century," (Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP), United States Army War College, 1997).
- "Cohen, William S. "Secretary of Defense Report to Congress Domestic Preparedness Program In the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction." 1 May 1997; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.
- "Cohen, William S. "Secretary of Defense Annual Report to the President and the Congress," Department of Defense, 2000.
- "Department of Defense: "Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Domestic Support Operations, Joint Publication 3-07.7." 3 July 2000; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet, accessed 10 October 2000.
- "Department of Defense: Reserve Integration Moves Forward With Establishment of Consequence Management Program Integration Office." 18 May 1998; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/>>; Internet; accessed 6 September 2000.
- "Defense Link, U.S. Department of Defense: Defense Policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)." 18 June 1998; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/issues/wmd.htm>>; Internet accessed 6 September 2000.
- "Defense Policy on Weapons of Mass Destruction," 18 June 1998; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet; accessed 6 September 2000.
- "Hamre, John J. "Deputy Secretary of Defense," Integrating National Guard and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction; 26 January 1998.
- "Gater, Harold, The Clarion-ledger, "Perspective, U.S. Anti-terrorism Effort Lacking," 20 November 2000; available from <<http://www.clarionledger.com>>; Internet, accessed 27 November 2000.

- "Harkey, Joe, "Integration of The Army National Guard in The Army Acquisition Corps: Future Prospective," (Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP), United States Army War College, 2000)
- "Omlie, Austin R., and Terry R. Council, "Requirements Assessment and Integration of the United States Army Reserve and the Army National Guard into the Army Acquisition Corps," (Army War College Strategic Research Project (SRP), United States Army War College, 1997).
- "Report of the Chairman of the Reserve Forces Policy Board," 1 March 1999; available from <<http://www.dtic.mil/execsec/adr1999/rfpbstat.htm>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.
- "Sheridan, Brain, "Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operation and Low-Intensity Conflict Before The Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities of The Committee on Armed Services." 24 March 2000; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil>>; Internet, accessed 9 November 2000.
- "Shinseki, Eric K., "Intent of the Chief of Staff, Army," 23 June 1999; available from <<http://hqda.army.mil/ocsa/intent.ppt>>; Internet, accessed 28 September 2000.
- "The National Guard Study: Fact Sheet No. 2." April 1998; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet, accessed 6 September 2000.
- "United States Army, "Army Reserve Gear up for Civil Support Mission" 22 March 2000; available from <<http://www.dtic.mil/armylink/nes>>; Internet, accessed 9 November 2000.
- "White Paper, "National Guard Role in a Weapons of Mass Destruction Incident" 17 March 1999; available from <<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/domestic>>; Internet, accessed 9 November 2000.